* Add user-owned IM channel connections
* Fix dev startup and channel connect popup
* Use async channel connect flow
* Harden dev service daemon startup
* Support local IM channel connections
* Align IM connections with local channels
* Fix safe user id digest algorithm
* Address Copilot IM channel feedback
* Address IM channel review comments
* Support all integrated IM channel connections
* Format additional channel connection tests
* Keep unavailable channel connect buttons clickable
* Fix IM channel provider icons
* Add runtime setup for enabled IM channels
* Guard global shortcut key handling
* Keep configured IM channels editable
* Avoid password autofill for channel secrets
* Make channel threads visible to connection owners
* Persist IM runtime config locally
* Allow disconnecting runtime IM channels
* Route no-auth channel sessions to local user
* Use default user for auth-disabled local mode
* Show IM channel source on threads
* Prefill IM channel runtime config
* Reflect IM channel runtime health
* Ignore Feishu message read events
* Ignore Feishu non-content message events
* Let setup wizard enable IM channels
* Fix frontend formatting after merge
* Stabilize backend tests without local config
* Isolate channel runtime config tests
* Address channel connection review comments
* Use sha256 user buckets with legacy migration
* Ensure runtime IM channels are ready after restart
* Persist disconnected IM channel state
* Address channel connection review comments
* Address channel connection review findings
Frontend connect flow:
- Open the runtime-config dialog only when a provider still needs
credentials; configured providers go straight to the connect flow, so
the binding-code/deep-link path is reachable from the UI again.
- After saving credentials, continue into the connect flow when a user
binding is still required (multi-user mode) instead of stopping at a
"Connected" toast.
- Extract shared provider-state helpers to core/channels/provider-state
and add unit + e2e coverage for the direct-connect and
configure-then-connect paths.
Provider status semantics:
- Report connection_status from the user's newest connection row;
with no binding it is not_connected, except in auth-disabled local
mode where a configured running channel is effectively connected.
Concurrency and event-loop correctness:
- Offload ChannelRuntimeConfigStore construction and writes, channel
service construction, and Slack connection replies to threads; add a
tests/blocking_io/ anchor for the runtime-config handlers.
- Consume binding codes with a conditional UPDATE so a code can only be
used once under concurrent workers; retry upsert_connection as an
update when a concurrent insert wins the unique constraint.
- Serialize ensure_channel_ready per channel so concurrent provider
polls cannot double-start a channel worker.
Config and migration hardening:
- Stop mutating the get_app_config()-cached Telegram provider config;
the runtime store now owns the UI-entered bot username.
- Register channel_connections in STARTUP_ONLY_FIELDS with the
standardized startup-only Field description.
- Match the legacy unsafe-id bucket by recomputing its exact SHA-1 name
so another user's same-prefix bucket can never be migrated.
- Remove the unused Telegram process_webhook_update path and document
src/core/channels in the frontend docs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Address PR review comments on authz scoping and channel runtime
Security (review feedback from ShenAC-SAC):
- Scope internal-token callers to the connection owner carried in
X-DeerFlow-Owner-User-Id instead of bypassing owner checks outright,
in both require_permission(owner_check=True) and the stateless run
endpoints. Internal callers keep access to their own and
shared/legacy threads, and may claim a default-owned channel thread
for its real owner, but a leaked internal token no longer grants
cross-user thread access.
- Require admin privileges for POST/DELETE /api/channels/{provider}/
runtime-config: runtime credentials and channel workers are
instance-wide shared state (same model as the MCP config API).
Read-only provider listing stays available to all users.
Performance (review feedback from willem-bd):
- Skip the redundant thread channel-metadata PATCH after the first
successful backfill per thread.
- Reuse the per-connection Slack WebClient until its token changes
instead of constructing one per outbound message.
- Reconcile channel readiness for all providers concurrently in
GET /api/channels/providers.
Also resolve the code-quality unused-import flag in the blocking-io
anchor by pre-importing the channel service via importlib.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Fix prettier formatting in provider-state test
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Reconcile UI runtime channel config with config reload on restart
Main now reloads a channel's config.yaml entry on restart_channel()
(#3514, issue #3497). Adapt the user-owned connection flow to coexist:
- configure_channel() restarts with reload_config=False — the caller
just supplied the authoritative config (browser-entered credentials
that are never written to config.yaml), so a file reload must not
clobber it with the stale on-disk entry.
- _load_channel_config() re-applies the UI runtime-store overlay used
at startup, so an operator-triggered restart keeps browser-entered
credentials for channels without a config.yaml entry and does not
resurrect a channel disconnected from the UI.
- Offload the reload's disk IO (config.yaml + runtime store) with
asyncio.to_thread, matching the blocking-IO policy on this branch.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
248 lines
7.4 KiB
Python
248 lines
7.4 KiB
Python
"""Tests for CSRF middleware."""
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from fastapi import FastAPI
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from starlette.testclient import TestClient
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from app.gateway.csrf_middleware import CSRFMiddleware
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def _make_app() -> FastAPI:
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app = FastAPI()
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app.add_middleware(CSRFMiddleware)
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@app.post("/api/v1/auth/login/local")
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async def login_local():
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return {"ok": True}
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@app.post("/api/v1/auth/register")
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async def register():
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return {"ok": True}
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@app.post("/api/threads/abc/runs/stream")
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async def protected_mutation():
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return {"ok": True}
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return app
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def test_auth_post_rejects_cross_origin_browser_request():
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"""CSRF-exempt auth routes must not accept hostile browser origins.
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Login/register endpoints intentionally skip the double-submit token because
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first-time callers do not have a token yet. They still set an auth session,
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so a hostile cross-site form POST must be rejected to avoid login CSRF /
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session fixation.
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"""
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client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="https://deerflow.example")
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response = client.post(
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"/api/v1/auth/login/local",
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headers={"Origin": "https://evil.example"},
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)
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assert response.status_code == 403
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assert response.json()["detail"] == "Cross-site auth request denied."
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def test_auth_post_allows_same_origin_browser_request():
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client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="https://deerflow.example")
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response = client.post(
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"/api/v1/auth/login/local",
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headers={"Origin": "https://deerflow.example"},
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)
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assert response.status_code == 200
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assert response.cookies.get("csrf_token")
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def test_auth_post_rejects_malformed_origin_with_path():
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client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="https://deerflow.example")
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response = client.post(
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"/api/v1/auth/login/local",
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headers={"Origin": "https://deerflow.example/path"},
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)
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assert response.status_code == 403
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assert response.json()["detail"] == "Cross-site auth request denied."
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assert response.cookies.get("csrf_token") is None
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def test_auth_post_rejects_malformed_origin_with_invalid_port():
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client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="https://deerflow.example")
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response = client.post(
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"/api/v1/auth/login/local",
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headers={"Origin": "https://deerflow.example:bad"},
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)
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assert response.status_code == 403
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assert response.json()["detail"] == "Cross-site auth request denied."
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assert response.cookies.get("csrf_token") is None
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def test_auth_post_allows_same_origin_default_port_equivalence():
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client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="https://deerflow.example")
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response = client.post(
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"/api/v1/auth/login/local",
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headers={"Origin": "https://deerflow.example:443"},
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)
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assert response.status_code == 200
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assert response.cookies.get("csrf_token")
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def test_auth_post_allows_forwarded_same_origin():
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client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="http://internal:8000")
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response = client.post(
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"/api/v1/auth/login/local",
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headers={
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"Origin": "https://deerflow.example",
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"X-Forwarded-Proto": "https",
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"X-Forwarded-Host": "deerflow.example, internal:8000",
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},
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)
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assert response.status_code == 200
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assert response.cookies.get("csrf_token")
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def test_auth_post_allows_forwarded_same_origin_with_non_default_port():
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client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="http://internal:8000")
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response = client.post(
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"/api/v1/auth/login/local",
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headers={
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"Origin": "http://localhost:2026",
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"X-Forwarded-Proto": "http",
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"X-Forwarded-Host": "localhost:2026",
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},
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)
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assert response.status_code == 200
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assert response.cookies.get("csrf_token")
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def test_auth_post_allows_rfc_forwarded_same_origin():
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client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="http://internal:8000")
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response = client.post(
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"/api/v1/auth/login/local",
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headers={
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"Origin": "https://deerflow.example",
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"Forwarded": "proto=https;host=deerflow.example",
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},
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)
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assert response.status_code == 200
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assert response.cookies.get("csrf_token")
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assert "secure" in response.headers["set-cookie"].lower()
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def test_auth_post_allows_explicit_configured_origin(monkeypatch):
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monkeypatch.setenv("GATEWAY_CORS_ORIGINS", "https://app.example")
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client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="https://api.example")
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response = client.post(
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"/api/v1/auth/register",
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headers={"Origin": "https://app.example"},
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)
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assert response.status_code == 200
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assert response.cookies.get("csrf_token")
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def test_auth_post_does_not_treat_wildcard_cors_as_allowed_origin(monkeypatch):
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monkeypatch.setenv("GATEWAY_CORS_ORIGINS", "*")
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client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="https://api.example")
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response = client.post(
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"/api/v1/auth/login/local",
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headers={"Origin": "https://evil.example"},
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)
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assert response.status_code == 403
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assert response.json()["detail"] == "Cross-site auth request denied."
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def test_auth_post_sets_strict_samesite_csrf_cookie():
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client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="https://deerflow.example")
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response = client.post(
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"/api/v1/auth/login/local",
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headers={"Origin": "https://deerflow.example"},
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)
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assert response.status_code == 200
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set_cookie = response.headers["set-cookie"].lower()
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assert "csrf_token=" in set_cookie
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assert "samesite=strict" in set_cookie
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assert "secure" in set_cookie
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def test_auth_post_without_origin_still_allows_non_browser_clients():
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client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="https://deerflow.example")
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response = client.post("/api/v1/auth/login/local")
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assert response.status_code == 200
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assert response.cookies.get("csrf_token")
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def test_non_auth_mutation_still_requires_double_submit_token():
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client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="https://deerflow.example")
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response = client.post(
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"/api/threads/abc/runs/stream",
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headers={"Origin": "https://deerflow.example"},
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)
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assert response.status_code == 403
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assert response.json()["detail"] == "CSRF token missing. Include X-CSRF-Token header."
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def test_non_auth_mutation_allows_valid_double_submit_token():
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client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="https://deerflow.example")
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client.cookies.set("csrf_token", "known-token")
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response = client.post(
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"/api/threads/abc/runs/stream",
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headers={
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"Origin": "https://deerflow.example",
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"X-CSRF-Token": "known-token",
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},
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)
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assert response.status_code == 200
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def test_non_auth_mutation_rejects_mismatched_double_submit_token():
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client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="https://deerflow.example")
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client.cookies.set("csrf_token", "cookie-token")
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response = client.post(
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"/api/threads/abc/runs/stream",
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headers={
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"Origin": "https://deerflow.example",
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"X-CSRF-Token": "header-token",
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},
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)
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assert response.status_code == 403
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assert response.json()["detail"] == "CSRF token mismatch."
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def test_channel_posts_require_double_submit_csrf():
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client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="https://deerflow.example")
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response = client.post(
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"/api/channels/slack/connect",
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headers={"Origin": "https://deerflow.example"},
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)
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assert response.status_code == 403
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assert response.json()["detail"] == "CSRF token missing. Include X-CSRF-Token header."
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