ed9ebfac4d
3 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
KKK
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3b3e8e1b0b
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feat(sandbox): strengthen bash command auditing with compound splitting and expanded patterns (#1881)
* fix(sandbox): strengthen regex coverage in SandboxAuditMiddleware
Expand high-risk patterns from 6 to 13 and medium-risk from 4 to 6,
closing several bypass vectors identified by cross-referencing Claude
Code's BashSecurity validator chain against DeerFlow's threat model.
High-risk additions:
- Generalised pipe-to-sh (replaces narrow curl|sh rule)
- Targeted command substitution ($() / backtick with dangerous executables)
- base64 decode piped to execution
- Overwrite system binaries (/usr/bin/, /bin/, /sbin/)
- Overwrite shell startup files (~/.bashrc, ~/.profile, etc.)
- /proc/*/environ leakage
- LD_PRELOAD / LD_LIBRARY_PATH hijack
- /dev/tcp/ bash built-in networking
Medium-risk additions:
- sudo/su (no-op under Docker root, warn only)
- PATH= modification (long attack chain, warn only)
Design decisions:
- Command substitution uses targeted matching (curl/wget/bash/sh/python/
ruby/perl/base64) rather than blanket block to avoid false positives
on safe usage like $(date) or `whoami`.
- Skipped encoding/obfuscation checks (hex, octal, Unicode homoglyphs)
as ROI is low in Docker sandbox — LLMs don't generate encoded commands
and container isolation bounds the blast radius.
- Merged pip/pip3 into single pip3? pattern.
* feat(sandbox): compound command splitting and fork bomb detection
Split compound bash commands (&&, ||, ;) into sub-commands and classify
each independently — prevents dangerous commands hidden after safe
prefixes (e.g. "cd /workspace && rm -rf /") from bypassing detection.
- Add _split_compound_command() with shlex quote-aware splitting
- Add fork bomb detection patterns (classic and while-loop variants)
- Most severe verdict wins; block short-circuits
- 15 new tests covering compound commands, splitting, and fork bombs
* test(sandbox): add async tests for fork bomb and compound commands
Cover awrap_tool_call path for fork bomb detection (3 variants) and
compound command splitting (block/warn/pass scenarios).
* fix(sandbox): address Copilot review — no-whitespace operators, >>/etc/, whole-command scan
- _split_compound_command: replace shlex-based implementation with a
character-by-character quote/escape-aware scanner. shlex.split only
separates '&&' / '||' / ';' when they are surrounded by whitespace,
so payloads like 'rm -rf /&&echo ok' or 'safe;rm -rf /' bypassed the
previous splitter and therefore the per-sub-command classifier.
- _HIGH_RISK_PATTERNS: change r'>\s*/etc/' to r'>+\s*/etc/' so append
redirection ('>>/etc/hosts') is also blocked.
- _classify_command: run a whole-command high-risk scan *before*
splitting. Structural attacks like 'while true; do bash & done'
span multiple shell statements — splitting on ';' destroys the
pattern context, so the raw command must be scanned first.
- tests: add no-whitespace operator cases to TestSplitCompoundCommand
and test_compound_command_classification to lock in the bypass fix.
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KKK
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055e4df049
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fix(sandbox): add input sanitisation guard to SandboxAuditMiddleware (#1872)
* fix(sandbox): add L2 input sanitisation to SandboxAuditMiddleware Add _validate_input() to reject malformed bash commands before regex classification: empty commands, oversized commands (>10 000 chars), and null bytes that could cause detection/execution layer inconsistency. * fix(sandbox): address Copilot review — type guard, log truncation, reject reason - Coerce None/non-string command to str before validation - Truncate oversized commands in audit logs to prevent log amplification - Propagate reject_reason through _pre_process() to block message - Remove L2 label from comments and test class names * fix(sandbox): isinstance type guard + async input sanitisation tests Address review comments: - Replace str() coercion with isinstance(raw_command, str) guard so non-string truthy values (0, [], False) fall back to empty string instead of passing validation as "0"/"[]"/"False". - Add TestInputSanitisationBlocksInAwrapToolCall with 4 async tests covering empty, null-byte, oversized, and None command via awrap_tool_call path. |
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SHIYAO ZHANG
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9aa3ff7c48
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feat(sandbox): add SandboxAuditMiddleware for bash command security auditing (#1532)
* feat(sandbox): add SandboxAuditMiddleware for bash command security auditing Addresses the LocalSandbox escape vector reported in #1224 where bash tool calls can execute destructive commands against the host filesystem. - Add SandboxAuditMiddleware with three-tier command classification: - High-risk (block): rm -rf /, curl|bash, dd if=, mkfs, /etc/shadow access - Medium-risk (warn): pip install, apt install, chmod 777 - Safe (pass): normal workspace operations - Register middleware after GuardrailMiddleware in _build_runtime_middlewares, applied to both lead agent and subagents - Structured audit log via standard logger (visible in langgraph.log) - Medium-risk commands execute but append a warning to the tool result, allowing the LLM to self-correct without blocking legitimate workflows - High-risk commands return an error ToolMessage without calling the handler, so the agent loop continues gracefully * fix(lint): sort imports in test_sandbox_audit_middleware * refactor(sandbox-audit): address Copilot review feedback (3/5/6) - Fix class docstring to match implementation: medium-risk commands are executed with a warning appended (not rejected), and cwd anchoring note removed (handled in a separate PR) - Remove capsys.disabled() from benchmark test to avoid CI log noise; keep assertions for recall/precision targets - Remove misleading 'cwd fix' from test module docstring * test(sandbox-audit): add async tests for awrap_tool_call * fix(sandbox-audit): address Copilot review feedback (1/2) - Narrow rm high-risk regex to only block truly destructive targets (/, /*, ~, ~/*, /home, /root); legitimate workspace paths like /mnt/user-data/ are no longer false-positived - Handle list-typed ToolMessage content in _append_warn_to_result; append a text block instead of str()-ing the list to avoid breaking structured content normalization * style: apply ruff format to sandbox_audit_middleware files * fix(sandbox-audit): update benchmark comment to match assert-based implementation --------- Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com> |