* fix(sandbox): add L2 input sanitisation to SandboxAuditMiddleware
Add _validate_input() to reject malformed bash commands before regex
classification: empty commands, oversized commands (>10 000 chars), and
null bytes that could cause detection/execution layer inconsistency.
* fix(sandbox): address Copilot review — type guard, log truncation, reject reason
- Coerce None/non-string command to str before validation
- Truncate oversized commands in audit logs to prevent log amplification
- Propagate reject_reason through _pre_process() to block message
- Remove L2 label from comments and test class names
* fix(sandbox): isinstance type guard + async input sanitisation tests
Address review comments:
- Replace str() coercion with isinstance(raw_command, str) guard so
non-string truthy values (0, [], False) fall back to empty string
instead of passing validation as "0"/"[]"/"False".
- Add TestInputSanitisationBlocksInAwrapToolCall with 4 async tests
covering empty, null-byte, oversized, and None command via
awrap_tool_call path.
* feat(sandbox): add SandboxAuditMiddleware for bash command security auditing
Addresses the LocalSandbox escape vector reported in #1224 where bash tool
calls can execute destructive commands against the host filesystem.
- Add SandboxAuditMiddleware with three-tier command classification:
- High-risk (block): rm -rf /, curl|bash, dd if=, mkfs, /etc/shadow access
- Medium-risk (warn): pip install, apt install, chmod 777
- Safe (pass): normal workspace operations
- Register middleware after GuardrailMiddleware in _build_runtime_middlewares,
applied to both lead agent and subagents
- Structured audit log via standard logger (visible in langgraph.log)
- Medium-risk commands execute but append a warning to the tool result,
allowing the LLM to self-correct without blocking legitimate workflows
- High-risk commands return an error ToolMessage without calling the handler,
so the agent loop continues gracefully
* fix(lint): sort imports in test_sandbox_audit_middleware
* refactor(sandbox-audit): address Copilot review feedback (3/5/6)
- Fix class docstring to match implementation: medium-risk commands are
executed with a warning appended (not rejected), and cwd anchoring note
removed (handled in a separate PR)
- Remove capsys.disabled() from benchmark test to avoid CI log noise;
keep assertions for recall/precision targets
- Remove misleading 'cwd fix' from test module docstring
* test(sandbox-audit): add async tests for awrap_tool_call
* fix(sandbox-audit): address Copilot review feedback (1/2)
- Narrow rm high-risk regex to only block truly destructive targets
(/, /*, ~, ~/*, /home, /root); legitimate workspace paths like
/mnt/user-data/ are no longer false-positived
- Handle list-typed ToolMessage content in _append_warn_to_result;
append a text block instead of str()-ing the list to avoid breaking
structured content normalization
* style: apply ruff format to sandbox_audit_middleware files
* fix(sandbox-audit): update benchmark comment to match assert-based implementation
---------
Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
KKK